

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

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U.S. Had No Hand in Sihanouk's Fall

By Jack Anderson

U.S. credibility has sunk so low that millions of Americans no longer trust the official statements about events in Southeast Asia. This column has been deluged with inquiries, for example, pleading for the truth about Cambodia.

Many Americans apparently suspect that the U.S. secretly engineered overthrow of left-leaning Prince Norodom Sihanouk and precipitated the Cambodian crisis. This column has carefully investigated the backstage activities and can state categorically that the U.S. played no part in Sihanouk's ouster.

President Nixon not only hoped to keep Cambodia neutral but was pleased to deal with Sihanouk. At the time of his downfall, ironically, he was appealing to Moscow and Peking to bring pressure on Hanoi to pull North Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia.

Queen Mother Role

His mother, Queen Sisowath Kossamak, at first hailed the anti-communist demonstrations in Cambodia. Not until her son reached her from Peking to warn that the demonstrations had gone too far did she reverse herself.

Then she played a backstage role in precipitating the showdown in the National Assembly. In secret meetings with Cambodian leaders, the Queen Mother expressed her displeasure

over the demonstrations, accused those who opposed her son of treason, and called for a vote of confidence in Sihanouk.

The Assembly, instead, voted Sihanouk out of power. The new leaders strived at first to maintain Cambodian neutrality and even delivered two protests to the U.S. embassy over American shelling and helicopter incursions across the border.

At this time there were only 11 people on the embassy staff. No other U.S. officials, CIA agents or special forces were present in Cambodia. The embassy staff has now been expanded to 16. Four of the newcomers were sent on temporary duty to improve the vital communications between Phnompenh and Washington.

Ever since diplomatic relations with Cambodia were restored last July, the embassy has been instructed to keep a low profile and not to meddle in Cambodian affairs.

Called on Carpet

Uneasy Interior officials were summoned to Capitol Hill the other day to explain why the Interior Department's top brass spent \$117,023 of the taxpayers' money to redecorate their executive suites. They appeared behind closed doors of the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee to answer charges by this column that Secretary of the Interior

Walter Hickel and other high officials splurged on expensive furniture, rich drapery and thick russet carpets in violation of the law.

Chairwoman Julia Hansen (D-Wash.) whose motherly look hides a steel-trap mind, first called Assistant Secretary Lawrence Dunn on the carpet.

"We are not exactly happy. It is not good for government, period!" she informed Dunn, who squirmed and looked to Budget Director Richard Hite for help.

"We just did not see the need to bring this matter to the committee's attention," Hite said lamely.

But Mrs. Hansen counts out the public's pennies as if they were a grade schooler's milk money. She commented:

"When you get down to putting funds for the pit toilets at Fort Union Trading Post in reserve because of the precarious (financial) position of the government, then it certainly looks like other projects should be curtailed."

'Emergency' Luxuries

Dunn tried to argue that they had not violated the law, which permits "emergency" expenditures without the usual safeguards. There was an "emergency" need, he claimed, to replace the furnishings they inherited from the Democrats. This had seemed quite plush enough to

Mrs. Hansen who intoned coldly:

"Have you established any cost ceilings on funds that may be spent for refurbishing an office?"

"No ma'am, we have not," sighed Hite.

Didn't the Bureau of the Budget insist on this?" she demanded.

"The direct answer is 'no,'" replied Hite.

"I don't like your kind of budget then," she snapped. "If you come up here with justifications that mean one thing to one person and another thing to someone else, we have a bad situation. This committee might just as well sit out in the middle of the Chesapeake and flag rowboats as hold budget hearings."

The Interior officials tried to convince the chairwoman that a Hickel crony from Seattle, who redecorated Hickel's office, had not been illegally hired, because he was in a "professional" category that heretofore had been reserved for physicians and attorneys.

At the end, they conceded that their effort to cover up juggled purchase orders was "erroneous and ill-advised" and that they failed to get the General Services Administration clearances required by law.

Mrs. Hansen extracted a promise from them that any more luxury binges will be brought before her committee in the future.

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SENATORS ANGRY

Some Seek to Cut Off Funds for Widened Military Action

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 29—

The Administration's decision to support a South Vietnamese military operation in Cambodia set off moves by leading Senators in both parties today to cut off funds for American military activities in Cambodia.

The moves—which could lead to a constitutional confrontation with the White House—were indicative of a widespread, angry and frustrated reaction in the Senate.

Some Senators, however, such as John Stennis of Mississippi, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Robert P. Griffin of Michigan, the assistant Republican leader, described the operation as a limited one designed to destroy North Vietnamese and Vietcong sanctuaries in Cambodia near the border of South Vietnam.

'Could Be a Turning Point'

Senator Stennis said that the destruction of the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia was "essential."

If the United States continues withdrawing troops from South Vietnam, supporting the Administration action, Senator Stennis said, it is clear that he was opposed to providing any "extra" military aid to the South Vietnamese Government.

It could be a turning point for us for the good, he said. "I do not believe in escalation—not yet."

The critical reaction to the Administration move was strongest among members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Two of its members—Senator John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho—announced they were drafting an amendment that would preclude the use of

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the Senate Democratic leader, and George D. Aiken, Republican of Vermont, announced that they would co-sponsor the amendment. Senator Mansfield expressed hope that the Senate would act on the measure next week.

Senators Aiken, Cooper and Mansfield have generally supported President Nixon's Vietnamization policy.

Senator George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, and Senator Mark O. Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, announced that they would move to attach a similar amendment to the military authorization bill, which is scheduled to reach the Senate floor in the middle of May.

In view of the critical reaction in the Senate, Senator Mansfield predicted that some amendment curbing the Administration's authority in Cambodia would almost certainly be adopted. With its sponsorship by prominent Senators of both parties, such an amendment could expect the support of the liberal-to-moderate majority in the Senate and would be opposed by the minority of conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats.

But whether such an amendment, if passed by the Senate, would be accepted by the House, where the reaction today to the Cambodian operation was more restrained, was questionable.

Regardless of the outlook for an amendment in the House however, it was apparent that an influential Senate coalition, which has long been critical of the Vietnam war, was now intent on a direct challenge to President Nixon on the Cambodian issue. The constitutional question now being intentionally raised by this coalition is whether the President has authority to embark upon military activities in Cambodia without the consent of the Congress.

To congressional observers, the Administration apparently underestimated the critical reaction in the Senate, particularly in Foreign Relations Committee, which on Monday strongly advised Secretary of State William P. Rogers against any American military involvement in Cambodia.

The Administration did not brief congressional leaders on the decision to support the South Vietnamese operation, and his first that many learned of the action was through news reports of the announcement by the Saigon Government to

Perhaps because of the absence of communications between the White House and Capitol Hill, there were differing views in the Senate on what was actually involved in the Cambodian operation.

Some Senators, including most members of the Foreign Relations Committee, saw the Administration embarking upon a critical policy decision that would lead to a broadening of the war in Southeast Asia and jeopardize plans for withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam.

But Senator Griffin said that Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, had called him about noon—several hours after the Saigon announcement—to emphasize that the operation was "a limited action," taken "in the interest of protecting American troops in Vietnam." Mr. Kissinger was said to have emphasized that the decision to support the South Vietnamese operation was in no way related to the request from Premier Lon Nol of Cambodia for American military assistance.

Senator Griffin said elimination of the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia "could hasten the day when American troops are brought home."

Support for the President's action also came from such conservative Republican Senators as John G. Tower of Texas and Peter H. Dominick of Colorado, both members of the Armed Services Committee. Senator Tower said that he was "encouraged by this action because it places anti-Communist forces in an improved military tactical position and because it will result in fewer American casualties in the long run."

Some Support Lost

By its action, however, the Administration appeared to have lost the support of two key Republican liberals—Senator Cooper and Senator Aiken—who have defended Nixon's policy in Vietnam against Democratic criticism.

Senator Aiken said: "I did not think the President would do what he reportedly has done, and I never was so disappointed in my life."

Senator Cooper described the action in Cambodia as a "U-turn" in Administration policy in Southeast Asia.

Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, said that the action "must be deemed to be the President's decision to expand the war into Cambodia."

Senator Charles E. Goodell, Republican of New York, said: "Today's action dramatically demonstrates how the strategy of Vietnamization has failed and how it pulls us inexorably into a wider war."

SECRET

JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Thursday - 30 April 1970

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1. [] C. B. Morrison, in the office of Senator Allen J. Ellender (D., La.), called to say that he had talked with the Senator about the possibility of his addressing the Mid-Career class on 12 June, but that the Senator expressed reservations in view of the very busy schedule he now has since he is acting chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Morrison added, however, that there would be no objection to our speaking directly to the Senator about this if we wished.

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2. [] Representative Paul McCloskey visited Headquarters early this morning for a briefing by Mr. [] SAVA, on the situation in Cambodia. McCloskey asked a number of questions about the military and political situation and prospects in Cambodia and adjacent areas of Southeast Asia, but at no time did he raise questions of U.S. policies or U.S. activities.

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3. [] Mr. William Miller, in the office of Senator John Sherman Cooper, called to ask that our briefing of Senator Cooper in response to questions contained in his letter to the Director be postponed from 3:30 today until 3:30 on Tuesday, 5 May.

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4. [] Received a call from Mrs. Mary McLaughlin, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, who requested a copy of [] the joint communique issued at the behest of Mr. Sihanouk on Tuesday. Mrs. McLaughlin asked if possible that it be forwarded to the Chairman this afternoon.

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The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(Mr. REID of New York asked and was given permission to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. REID of New York. Finally, let me just say I think this amendment is consistent both with existing law and with the President's determination to narrow the war and not to widen it.

I think it will reassure the country that there are limits to the extension of American power.

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I am happy to yield to my colleague from New York.

Mr. HORTON. I wish to commend the gentleman for the amendment he has offered. I support it. I certainly think it is a reasonable amendment. It is certainly in line with the statements the President has made on numerous occasions with regard to the Nixon doctrine.

On the eve of the President's message to the Nation on the Cambodia crisis, I want to state publicly my own analysis of the problems and priorities which face us in Indochina.

Some background review is important before discussing what our decisions should be at this juncture.

First, the President is in the midst of a laudable program to Vietnamize the war in Vietnam and has made substantial progress in withdrawing American Marine and Army units which serve in an infantry or ground combat capacity. During the unfolding of the President's withdrawal program, the Communist North Vietnamese military threat to two nominally neutral nations, Cambodia and Laos, has been severely intensified. Both these countries have been important as sanctuaries and supply routes for North Vietnamese and Vietcong units operating in South Vietnam. But, until recently, the neutralist governments of Laos and Cambodia were not immediately endangered, although there was partial disclosure of American military support efforts to help the Royalists in Laos hold back Communist Pathet Lao advances.

Then the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia by an anti-Communist coup dramatically altered the focal point of military confrontation in Indochina, with the North Vietnamese seeking to gain military and political control over at least a substantial portion of Cambodian territory, and announcing their intention to install Sihanouk as a presumably Communist ruler of this territory.

A whole host of U.S. interests and foreign policy questions are being tested by the decision our Government makes in this crisis. Having been requested by the new Cambodian regime to send U.S. military hardware and assistance to use against North Vietnamese and Vietcong who are advancing on Phnom Penh, the President must decide far more than the desirability of supporting this fledgling regime.

The following arguments have been put forth in support of American military assistance and involvement in Cambodia:

First. That neutralization of Cambodian territory, now in Communist hands, is essential for the protection of American troops remaining in South Vietnam. The President has mentioned repeatedly that he would not permit his policy of withdrawal to endanger those American GI's who remain on duty in Southeast Asia. The use of Cambodia, particularly the "Parrot's Beak" area nearest Saigon, as a military sanctuary has made the task of allied troops in Vietnam more difficult. The question is whether this fact alone warrants American involvement in the confrontation between two opposing Cambodian regimes, and whether defense of U.S. troops requires an active invasion deep into Cambodia.

We must continue to protect the lives of American soldiers remaining in South Vietnam. In my view, military actions we have been undertaking for many months, permitting hot pursuit of enemy units attacking from across the Cambodian border, or seeking sanctuary in Cambodia should not be curtailed if deemed necessary to protect American lives. But hot pursuit does not encompass supporting or undertaking an invasion of Cambodia, with the intent of supporting the regime there. It may encompass supporting an action limited to destruction of sanctuary areas used to shelter Communist troops which operate in South Vietnam.

In the final analysis, the best way to defend and protect American lives in South Vietnam is to continue policies that would enable these young men to return home at the earliest possible date. It is doubtful that any extension of our military commitment into Cambodia would hasten this homecoming.

Second. That the de facto control of most of Laos by the Communists and the current threat to Cambodia is proof of the domino theory at work, and that if the United States does not help restore neutrality to these areas, Thailand will be threatened next.

There is little question that Communist military persistence, backward social organization, and the impoverishment of the people of these countries would have led to North Vietnamese dominance if it were not for the presence of large numbers of U.S. forces and equipment in Thailand and South Vietnam, and for U.S. advisory and hardware assistance to Laos. The question is, Has our military involvement done anything but postpone North Vietnamese Communist dominance? Or, if Vietnamization will be successful, will it take a similar injection of American lives and dollars to accomplish a stalemate in Cambodia, or Laos, or later on, in Thailand?

Third. A third argument is made that the provision of adviser and hardware assistance, short of sending U.S. ground units, is consistent with the Nixon foreign policy doctrine announced in the summer of 1969 in Guam. This, in my judgment is too narrow an interpretation of the Nixon doctrine. The doctrine does preclude the unilateral dispatch of U.S. ground troops to a nation like Cambodia, but it also requires, as a prere-

quisite to any U.S. assistance, a decision by other free world governments in the region to send material and troop support to defend a government threatened by Communist military takeover. Although there has been some discussion that Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, and Indochina, in addition to South Vietnam and Korea should mount some joint assistance program to the new Cambodian regime, no positive steps have been taken to carry out any such plan. There is little question that the fall of Cambodia to Communist rule is a far more important threat to these East Asian and Pacific nations than to the United States.

The Nixon doctrine seeks to modify the U.S. leadership of the free world, and to remove from our shoulders the primary burden of serving as world policeman wherever anti-Communist governments are threatened.

These arguments put forth for U.S. involvement in Cambodia indicate the far-reaching consequences of the President's decision. First, he must weigh what commitment, if any, the United States has to this or any Cambodian regime. At what point would U.S. involvement or assistance cease if the threat to the current regime is not immediately ended?

Second, he must weigh the actual threat to American lives that continued Communist occupation of Cambodia would entail. Remembering that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese have been operating out of Cambodia for several years, the question must be asked whether the current threat to our troops is so much greater now that it justifies a widening of U.S. involvement in the war across all of Indo-China, and going beyond the restricted policy of hot pursuit.

Third, and perhaps most important, the President must be aware that his decision will set crucial precedents for the application of his own Nixon doctrine. If he narrowly construes it to mean that only the sending of organized units of U.S. ground troops is prohibited, it will mean little in terms of the changing U.S. role in the world. Also, the role of advisers to ground units of other nations must somehow be explained in the context of the doctrine. If we do not begin now to apply the principle that free nations in the threatened region must choose to involve themselves before America gets involved, then it will be difficult if not futile to try to encourage or enforce any regional defense concept in the future.

The whole question of the Nixon doctrine and its application to Cambodia and Laos includes the consideration of the American crisis of national priorities. We have, with the President's policy of disengagement from Southeast Asia, been moving toward a realistic balance between military and domestic budgetary efforts. If suddenly the U.S. role in Southeast Asia is widened, and not narrowed, if our financial commitments to these countries promises to tie down billions of U.S. dollars in Indochina for years to come, then we will not have met the challenge of our most serious domes-

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would also wipe out thousands of small contractors in this country. This could not work. You could not enter into a contract like that, this just simply could not happen. And moreover you would not have the Poseidon, and you would not have the retrofitted Polaris, you would not have the S-3A, the P-3C, the C-5A, which is working. You would not have anything, but you would have the pleasure of stopping a company—you would have the pleasure of stopping a company. This might sound fine, but it cannot work. It positively cannot work. That is how simple it is.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. Of course I will yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly agree with the gentleman from South Carolina that this is a completely destructive amendment, rather than being an objective amendment, because if, as the gentleman says, it is going to slow down or possibly stop some of the essential production we need in this country so as to keep America strong and safe, then I think the amendment ought to be completely and overwhelmingly defeated.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not know how long in the future they make contracts for ads in one of these magazines. I would imagine it is many, many months, and I would recommend them stopping it, although I do not know anything about this. I do not know anything about them putting ads in magazines, but I would recommend that they stop until they are out of their financial crisis.

Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to help anyone because of sentiment, but because it is for the security of America, and if it not advantageous to the security of this country then do not give them anything, but cutting off a half a loaf will not hurt Lockheed as much as it will hurt you.

I urge you to reject this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. PIKE) there were—ayes 21, noes 58.

So the amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. REID OF NEW YORK

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. REID of New York:

On page 6, following line 8, add the following new section:

"Sec. 403. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, no part of the funds authorize to be appropriated pursuant to this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand or Cambodia."

(Mr. REID of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is simple; it is to prohibit the use of American ground combat forces in Cambodia, Laos,

or Thailand. The House, in my judgment, is coequal with the Senate in this regard, and it has to some extent been derelict in the past for not taking a position that is obviously clear, and I think in this instance it must fulfill its constitutional obligation and responsibility.

In the fiscal year 1970 appropriation bill for the Department of Defense, as Members know, there is a limitation based on the amendment offered by Senator COOPER and Senator CHURCH precluding funds for the use of U.S. ground combat troops in Laos or Thailand.

Last December, after the bill had been signed and enacted into law, the administration, through Press Secretary Ziegler said:

Anyone familiar with the Nixon doctrine, as outlined on Guam, knows the amendment is totally consistent with the President's policy. As we have said on a number of occasions, there are no U.S. ground troops in either country nor did this Administration visualize under this bill putting any ground combat troops into these countries.

My amendment would have the simple effect of adding Cambodia to this prohibition on the use of ground forces. It is a limitation. It provides no sanctions.

It has been repeatedly stated by the President and high administration officials that there is no present intention to use our ground combat forces in these countries.

Since approving the amendment to the appropriation bill last year precluding the introduction of ground combat troops in Laos and Thailand, President Nixon has reiterated his desire to limit the war in Asia—not to broaden it. He has said:

We have no plan for introducing ground combat forces into Laos.

In addition, on explaining his doctrine pronounced at Guam, he said in his November 3 speech:

In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

Finally, I would like to briefly quote Secretary Rogers, who, when asked whether Laos would become another Vietnam, answered:

The President won't let it happen.

Continuing, he said:

I mean we have learned one lesson, and that is we are not going to fight any major wars in the mainland of Asia again and we are not going to send American troops there, and we certainly aren't going to do it unless we have the American public and the Congress behind us.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment is also consistent with the national commitments resolution passed by the other body on June 25, 1969, by a vote of 70 to 16, expressing the sense of the Senate that the U.S. Armed Forces should not be used abroad or promised for use abroad except by joint authority of the President and the Congress.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman for bringing this amendment to the floor. I support it.

We ought to be extracting ourselves from Vietnam and not implicating ourselves in Cambodia.

I would ask the gentleman whether in his amendment the words "American ground combat troops" include the concept of American combat advisers.

Mr. REID of New York. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. REUSS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. REID of New York. Further, as Members know, article I, section 8, of the Constitution gives the Congress the authority to declare war, raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

These powers were authorized explicitly to the Congress as a vital part of the doctrine of the separation of powers.

Alexander Hamilton, a strong advocate of strong Executive power, wrote in the Federalist Paper No. 69 showing the clear distinction between the British and American systems in the delegation of American powers to the legislature. He said:

The President is to be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy, while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.

Indeed, in 1848 Abraham Lincoln, then a Congressman, said:

Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion and you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such a purpose and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, after you have given him so much as you propose.

The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress, was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons. Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was to object. This, our convention undertook to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.

Dwight Eisenhower said very explicitly in March 1954:

There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is the result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it. Now let us have that clear.

In a word, therefore, I think it is clear that the Congress, and this House, must not let its powers be eroded. We must not back into a wider war.

Our responsibility is clear.

Further, this amendment in my judgment is consistent—

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tic crisis. At a time when the very institutions of American government are being tested as to their adequacy and relevancy to respond to the needs of our people, this could be a disastrous error.

I believe strongly that the people of the United States have no interest in Cambodia that would override our interest in disengaging from Southeast Asia, or that would override the President's earlier announced intentions to place the burden for defense of these governments on themselves and on other free nations in the East and Southeast Asian area.

Any commitment of U.S. troops, to prop up the new Cambodian regime, whether as advisers or as ground units, will render the most important plank of the Nixon doctrine meaningless. Even if we were to attain a quick military victory in Cambodia, which is extremely doubtful, the overall effect of U.S. involvement will be a widening of the Vietnam conflict across the whole subcontinent of Indochina.

We in 1970, are still suffering from the effects of a decision to enter a halfway war in the early 1960's. Any risk of extending the United States into an escalation or widening of this military stalemate should be avoided at this stage of American history.

The military budget in this fiscal year and the next is already too high. I have voted on the House floor today, in teller votes, to cut substantial amounts from the military procurement bill in areas where I believe national security is not compromised and where domestic considerations are overriding.

I fully support the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID) to prohibit the use of any U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand.

No one has suggested that outright destruction of all Communist forces and governments in Indochina is or should be our goal. Without any justification for a decision this drastic, there is absolutely no justification for America to extend its entry into a military holding action, or standoff confrontation in Cambodia or Laos. It was a mistake to sacrifice 41,000 Americans in Vietnam. We must not make the same mistake again, when the evidence is so clear that other international and domestic crises may engulf us if we do.

The best way to protect American troops is not to enlarge the war to include Cambodia—but to bring American troops home.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding. I wanted to understand whether the gentleman's amendment, if it were adopted, would prevent the action that is now underway in the Parrot's Beak section of Cambodia, which the President is apparently going to discuss on television tonight. Would this amendment outlaw that activity even before the President has had an opportunity to explain what the situation is?

Mr. REID of New York. I would say

to the gentleman that this is a limitation on the use of ground combat forces. It provides no sanction, but it clearly does not preclude the use of funds for advisers or air support.

Mr. STRATTON. This would not interfere then with advisers, or with air support, or with medevac personnel and so on, is that correct?

Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude their use. It provides no sanction for it. It provides a limitation against the use of regular ground combat forces.

Mr. STRATTON. Does the amendment or does it not eliminate funds for the kind of people who are now operating in the Parrot's Beak area?

Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude funds for advisers or for air support.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman. I am glad to have his statement.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I yield to the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad there was an apparent clarification of a response that was given a moment ago. If I recollect the question asked by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. REUSS), he asked whether your amendment would preclude the military advisers. The impression I got from the response was that the amendment, under ground combat forces, would preclude the utilization of military advisers.

Mr. REID of New York. If the gentleman will permit me, my understanding is that the gentleman from Wisconsin asked whether the amendment would permit the use of advisers. My understanding is that this amendment would not preclude their use.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In other words, your amendment would not in any way interfere with the current operation the President has authorized to destroy the sanctuaries of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong in Cambodia?

Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude air support. It does not preclude advisers. It does not preclude equipment. But it does preclude the use of regular American ground combat forces in Cambodia.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I have in the well of the House two maps I want all Members to see. I think if I get beside them I can explain them best. I am indicating the areas that are presently affected. Just about everyone of my acquaintance believes in the concept of hot pursuit. The Vietcong troops would go into sanctuaries inside of Cambodia and Laos. We are now talking about Cambodia. These areas to which I am pointing are the areas where they have been causing the most trouble. Observe how close that area is to Saigon—only 30 miles. We have been wondering how they could blow up Saigon every week. It was simple for Sihanouk. They are only 30 miles away. They could get the stuff where the troops have R. & R. in very large deploy-

ment areas. They have all sorts of storage areas there. They have training areas. They have just about developed this country as a staging area from which to attack Vietnam.

Moreover, they have been flanking our troops and causing terrific damage. We could win the war right here. We tried to get Sihanouk to let us do it. Nothing doing. This crowd did let us do it. I do not know how long this crowd is going to be in business and running this country, but while they are giving us the opportunity to go in and wipe out what has killed so many of our American boys, right on the border—less than 25 miles in, because I am not talking about going all over this country and taking it over—we should take advantage of the opportunity. This is to our advantage and to the advantage of the Vietnamese. We can get right across the border and clean out the bases. This is what they have been doing.

This is right along where the Ho Chi Minh Trail comes, right down this way (indicating) and through Laos and into Cambodia, and right across into the Mekong. Nothing stops them.

We can go in there and intercept the Ho Chi Minh Trail insofar as it applies to Cambodia.

We do not want to stop the President from doing that. I do not know what the President is going to say tonight. I have not talked to him. But this is what he has got to think about. If the Vietnamization is going to succeed, we have to do this first. It is as simple as that. I would not want the gentleman's amendment to keep us from going in and to keep us from doing those things that all of the generals—including Westmoreland and Abrams—have told us we must do. But while they are letting us do it, we are doing what we have begged Sihanouk to let us do. Members must remember when Sihanouk captured our sailors.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, is it the chairman's opinion that to accomplish this, we have to use ground combat troops?

Mr. RIVERS. It is just across the border, 25 miles across the border.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, do we have to use ground combat troops?

Mr. RIVERS. They would be on the soil, yes, but it would not have anything to do with running the government. It is doing what we want to do and what we need to do. It will destroy these areas. Until we destroy these areas, they will infiltrate South Vietnam forever and ever, and the minute Sihanouk gets in, we would not be able to get in there anyway. These are the areas I am talking about. See how every one of them is on the border of the countries.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I think the point needs to be made certainly that, first of all, this border has not been surveyed and it vacillates, and the sanctu-

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aries are on the places where theoretically the border is not by treaty, but by mutual agreement between these peoples who oppose each other.

Second, our only men going in there are in an advisory capacity to the Vietnamese who, themselves, need to eliminate these sanctuaries. Would the gentleman agree with that?

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I think it ought to be pointed out in addition that throughout our history the President of the United States as Commander in Chief has had and has exercised the power and the authority on occasion to land ground combat troops in case of emergency. But under this amendment, if American citizens' lives were being jeopardized in Thailand or Cambodia—or for that matter, in the Mediterranean or anywhere else—the President could not send the Marines in under this amendment. This is no time or place to attempt to circumscribe or reduce the historical powers and prerogatives of the President of the United States.

Mr. RIVERS. Of course not. The President should be commended. This saves the lives of our troops. We should have done this long ago.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina has expired.

(On request of Mr. NEDZI, and by unanimous consent, Mr. RIVERS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, as I say, I have not talked with the President, but this is undoubtedly what he has to think about. These people have been standing there and lunging at us and they have the stuff in there, and do not let anybody kid us about it. They will bring old Sihanouk back there in short order.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for getting me this additional time.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I must say I am in direct opposition on this particular amendment.

Mr. Chairman, those who serve on the Armed Services Committee, while we do not have all the answers, are privileged on occasion to get some inside information. But, being activated, like every Member of this House, by pure love of our country, those of us who are privileged to know some of these things are in direct opposition to this amendment. It is not in the best interest of this country.

Who can outguess the President of the United States at this particular time? He is going to be on the television tonight at 9 o'clock.

Mr. Chairman, let us see what the President is going to say. Then, after what is said, we will support him in what has to be done in the best interest of this country.

This is no time for us to say to the man who has more information than

any other single person in America, who is motivated by the same things we are motivated by, what is to be done. I repeat, what is being done is what has to be done for the sake of this country.

Mr. RIVERS. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. NEDZI. Would the chairman comment on the headline which appears in the Washington Daily News today which summarizes or epitomizes a radio column which I heard this morning quoting the Cambodian Government spokesman. The headline says, "Cambodia as Neutral Can't Approve Our Aid."

He clearly indicated, or at least was quoted as saying aid was not asked for.

Mr. RIVERS. I do not know a thing about that.

Any excuse we can get to go in and help clean out this thing will help Vietnamization and save the lives of Americans. I would hate to see us do anything to stop it.

Furthermore, we could never tell the President how to run foreign policy. He will tell us, as the gentlemen know, it is none of our business.

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. Of course I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. REUSS. Do I have the gentleman's position straight? Is it that the gentleman from South Carolina feels the United States should introduce American ground combat troops into Cambodia and therefore opposes the Reid amendment?

Mr. RIVERS. No; that is not true.

Mr. REUSS. Will the gentleman state his position?

Mr. RIVERS. My position is we should introduce troops in there if it is necessary to remove those things which are killing American boys. If we can do it by way of the Vietnamese Army, by way of giving them the material they need, when they get there they will find enough material.

Mr. REUSS. If we cannot do it by the Vietnamese Army, would the gentleman favor it with the American Army?

Mr. RIVERS. If we are ever going to secure that country these things have to be eliminated.

This is the only government that permitted us to go in there. We have tried every way before. This is the only government left.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. Certainly I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. REID of New York. I appreciate the chairman's yielding.

Might I ask the chairman whether it is now a matter of law we cannot introduce ground combat forces into Laos and Thailand?

Mr. RIVERS. That is right. That is a mistake.

If there is any country we ought to go to the aid of, if needed, it is Thailand, because they let us come in there in the darkest days of our adversity and never told the world a thing. We built bases

there and used our fighters and our bombers out of Thailand.

To keep us from going to their aid is just a monumental act of ingratitude, in my opinion.

Mr. REID of New York. One final quick question, and I thank the gentleman for yielding.

If the President did send ground combat troops into Cambodia, for whatever reason it might be necessary, does the gentleman see an end of the war or does he see that as leading to a wider war?

Mr. RIVERS. If the gentleman is talking about these areas here, it is bound to shorten the war.

It will do two things. It will eliminate these things (pointing) and it will intercept the Ho Chi Minh buildup, which is coming down there like an interstate highway. The Ho Chi Minh Trail is very vast, over a very wide area. This is a part of it.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I take this time—and I hope not to take it all—to caution the House about taking an action of this kind this afternoon just before the President is going to address the Nation.

I, for one, might even support this amendment at a different time. I am opposed to the entering of U.S. ground troops into Cambodia without prior consultation with Congress. However, I would caution the Members of this House this afternoon that if this amendment is passed, you will see the greatest exodus from that press gallery you ever saw, and they will all be heading for the telephones. What they will be doing is broadcasting all over the country, all over the world, that the Congress of the United States has predetermined the judgment of the President even before he made his remarks. This is the worst time that this amendment could possibly be brought forth.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. I not only agree with the gentleman, but let me say this: We have less than a month of fair weather over there. If we are going to eliminate these things, the time to do it is now—the time is now. When the rainy season comes it is more difficult, and that is what these people are waiting for.

Mr. CEDERBERG. May I say in addition to that that militarily I do not believe we should allow a sanctuary of this kind to exist. I am all for the South Vietnamese taking care of it and I hope they will do the task, but to allow these troops to come in during the day or during the night, into combat and kill our troops and maim the civilians and the South Vietnamese and then go back to a sanctuary and resupply themselves just does not make any combat sense.

I plead with the Members of this House, please do not take this action of approving this kind of an amendment just before the President is going to go on television. It is a tragic mistake.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. The gentleman's statement puzzles me a little bit. The President argued and only last week the Secretary of State told by subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations that the Congress would be consulted before any movement into another Asian country would take place. All this amendment speaks to is the introduction of ground combat troops. Does the gentleman argue that—if the President makes a good case tonight or any other night that we need combat troops in Cambodia to protect American lives—the Congress would not give him that authority in a very short time?

Mr. CEDERBERG. I will not prejudge what the President will say tonight or at any other time.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Of course, we do not know what he will say.

Mr. CEDERBERG. The gentleman knows what will happen if the House of Representatives takes this position this afternoon before the President can address the Nation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, today we are faced with a very serious problem, one that affects every home in our country. In 1964 we had a problem similar to this. At that time we were told that the *Turner Joy* and the *Maddox* had been attacked by North Vietnamese ships. Now in looking into that you find that the commanding officers of those ships will not state they were under attack. But under pressure such as exists here and under strong pleading and suggestion from men high in the offices of this House, our House succumbed and passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I want to tell you that since that time we have had 7 years of the most horrible war that has ever been visited on the people of the United States.

You know, one of the sad things about this war is that if a youngster can get into college, he does not go to the war. If he can get into the Reserves, he does not go to the war. If he can get into the National Guard, he does not go to the war. It is the poor people, the fellows who cannot go to college, who are brought in. If there was ever a war, a horrible war, that was unjustified, this is it. Plainly this is a rich man's war and a poor man's fight.

In a war involving the poorer sons of our country. I strongly support the amendment of the gentleman from New York and I ask that you consider this. I ask that you think calmly and deeply as to whether we are going to enter into a war worse than we are in at the present time. I say that this possibility exists today and now.

Mr. Chairman, Stephen Decatur once said:

Our country in her intercourse with other nations may she always be in the right, but our country, right or wrong.

We might alter that today, Mr. Chairman, and say, "Our country, right or wrong. If right, to be kept right. If wrong, to be set right."

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. FASCELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I am not going into the military aspects of the Southeast Asia problem.

However, I want to put in perspective what it is we are actually going to do under this amendment because I think that is important in the consideration of the overall principle sought to be raised by the gentleman's amendment.

I think regardless of how we are going to vote, it is important to have a clear understanding of the actual operative potential as compared to its being an expression of congressional policy.

So, first, I would like to ask the chairman of the full Committee on Armed Services whether there are any funds in this bill to finance ground troops.

Mr. RIVERS. There are no funds for personnel and no O. & M. money.

Mr. FASCELL. I am sorry but I did not hear the chairman.

Mr. RIVERS. There is no money for military personnel and no O. & M. money.

Mr. FASCELL. What does "O. & M." money mean?

Mr. RIVERS. Operations and maintenance.

Mr. FASCELL. Therefore, in order for the prohibition in the gentleman from New York's amendment to be effective or have any real meaning as far as the subject matter of this bill, it must apply to equipment and other materiel used to move ground forces into Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand; is that correct?

Mr. RIVERS. Am I to understand that the amendment is certainly germane?

Mr. FASCELL. I understand it is germane to the bill, but I just want to know what the fund prohibition really applies to.

The question I raise does not go to the overall principle as an expression of sentiment by the Congress. I think expression is worthwhile any time the Congress wants to speak on such an important matter. The question of the introduction of ground troops into any area of Southeast Asia is relevant, but I would like to know whether the fund prohibition in the amendment actually is effective as it applies to this bill. From what I understand, as the chairman just responded, it really is not.

So, it is not a legal proscription of the President's right to commit troops, or to pay for them out of other funds. It is an expression of the sense of Congress, however, which might or might not be important to the administration and which it may consider. But it legally does not proscribe the President. This is the only point I am making, at this juncture.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, I submit that this amendment as a matter of legal action cannot possibly change the treaty commitments which the United States has with Thailand. As a matter of law, I do not believe the Congress can do that. I do not believe, therefore, even as an expression of sentiment, the gentleman's amendment can change the treaty commitments and the right of the President

under the Constitution to implement those requirements.

It still is, however, if adopted, a very important and vital expression of the sentiment of Congress. But I do not want us to deceive ourselves that we are putting some monetary restriction on the President or that we are changing some treaty commitment or that we are changing the authority under the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. We are not doing any of that with this amendment.

Finally, Mr. Chairman this amendment can only be effective on the date this bill becomes effective, if passed. The effective date is the beginning of the next fiscal year, July 1, 1970.

Notwithstanding that, Mr. Chairman, I believe the amendment is an expression of a fundamental policy by this Congress which is vital. However, it does not undermine the President's right to say anything he wants to say tonight about this deplorable situation in Southeast Asia; it does not restrict him monetarily; it does not restrict him legally, and does not modify this country's treaty obligations, and does not change Presidential policy.

It does say, therefore, by inference and construction that it does want the President to come back to Congress.

Therefore, this expression of Congressional sentiment, very limited in its actual application, nevertheless is a useful guideline.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.

(Mr. MOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, I must express my sense of dismay at the statement made by the gentleman from Michigan in talking about his President and our President over here. I have only one President, at one time. As I recall, that is the precise provision in the Constitution of the United States. President Nixon is my President, and he is the President of the United States, and I respect the onerous nature of the office he occupies, and the awesome problems which confront him but I also recognize that this House is one house of a two-house, coequal body which has very serious responsibilities imposed upon it by the Constitution and by the people of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, if this situation is so very delicate that we should not act at this moment in advance of the President's speech this evening, then it seems to me that the appropriate action would be for the Committee to rise and await the statement of the President, and then act, following that statement, upon the basis of any new evidence. Upon the absence of that evidence and under the compulsion to act now, I am going to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID) because I have returned not many weeks ago from Southeast Asia, where I think I undertook a rather responsible inquiry and a very comprehensive inquiry, and the developments which have occurred since my return have not surprised me

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greatly, and there are other developments which could take place which would not surprise me greatly.

Mr. Chairman, I would point out that it is 17 years since we went into South Korea, and I can see two or three decades of involvement in Southeast Asia, and I can see it on an ever-expanding basis of our material resources, and I know that there is an increasingly strident demand in this Nation for a greater share of those resources.

I have no question as to the motives of some of those who oppose the United States overseas, but I know what dire dangers we face here at home if we continue to do the bad job of housekeeping, to ignore the ills of our own domestic society. We can be destroyed as surely from within as we can by any force or combination of forces from without.

It is time that we start to realize our priorities. The fact that a man steps into this well and opposes an expansion of military activities is in no sense an indictment of his patriotism. I believe that at some times, under the conditions of the moment, it takes more courage to step here and say, "Let us go slow, let us evaluate and reevaluate. Let us know what the hazards of the action we are taking might be," than it does just to stand up and say "I am going along, and I am going to wrap myself up in the flag in the process."

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOSS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I wish to say I agree with and appreciate this statement and concur that this is a matter that the House should act on.

But I would like to advise the Members that I suggested to the leadership, due to the seriousness of the matter and the fact that the President is going to speak tonight, that I thought it might be appropriate to adjourn so we could vote after the President spoke and not before. But I would advise the Members that suggestion, that I was very sensitive to, and which the gentleman mentioned, was declined.

SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY
MR. FINDLEY

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FINDLEY in the nature of a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. REID of New York:

In place of the amendment, substitute the following language:

"Sec. 403. In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized by this act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia without the prior consent of the Congress, except to the extent that such is required, as determined by the President and reported promptly to the Congress, to protect the lives of American troops remaining within South Vietnam."

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think we all owe the gentleman from New York a debt of gratitude because he has

caused us to enter into a very timely and, I think, very helpful discussion of fundamental military policy, one of the very few such occasions in the 9 years I have been here in the House of Representatives, years in which I have seen an unfolding of military operations unprecedented in our country, and yet almost never do we discuss the fundamental issue of the role of the United States in these far away places.

The distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I feel, put his finger right on the heart of this issue—and I say this kindly—when he closed his comments by saying that if we try, by an amendment of this sort, to tell the President of the United States what to do in the field of foreign policy, the President would respond quite properly, to use the words of the gentleman from South Carolina, "It is none of your business."

I believe that that is a rather widely held assumption, that what happens in foreign policy, especially in fundamental military policy, is really none of the business of the Congress.

It is hard for me to accept that. In fact, I disagree absolutely with such a conclusion.

The amendment I have presented in the form of a substitute retains all of the language of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID). But, it adds some things that are unspoken by the gentleman from New York, and I think these unspoken items should be spelled out.

It deals with the item that has been in so much controversy here. Whether in a crisis, requiring a split-second decision by the President through his commanders as to whether ground combat forces should move a few feet across the Cambodian border in order to protect the lives of American troops in South Vietnam—whether or not he could respond.

Of course, the President has a grave responsibility as Commander in Chief—an overriding responsibility to protect U.S. lives whether they are in American uniform or not.

So, even if the Congress would say to the contrary—that he should not do it—it is my belief that he would have the fundamental responsibility to these American citizens to take the action—to protect their lives.

Mr. FINDLEY. I am sorry, I missed the last part of the gentleman's question.

Mr. RIVERS. Does the gentleman's amendment say in so many words that we may enter Cambodia for the purpose of protecting the lives of American troops?

Mr. FINDLEY. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. Will the gentleman read that language of the amendment again?

Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, indeed. I am glad to. It states, "without the prior consent of the Congress"; then it adds the words, "except to the extent that such is required, as determined by the President and reported promptly to the Congress, to protect the lives of American troops remaining within South Vietnam."

I am glad to clarify that point and appreciate the question.

Mr. RIVERS. That is what I was trying to say. I can find no fault with an amendment like that.

Mr. FINDLEY. I appreciate the gentleman's comment.

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I would like to ask a question on the subject about which you were just speaking.

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. HORTON. As I understood the statement the gentleman in the well made, he was talking about the idea of hot pursuit, and as I would understand hot pursuit, that would be immediately over the border to protect the ground forces in the immediate vicinity of Cambodia, the South Vietnamese border.

Mr. FINDLEY. I will say to the gentleman, if I may interrupt, that I would hope and expect the President to exercise a very narrow construction on this implied authority to use ground troops outside the borders of South Vietnam, but I can conceive of instances when this would be necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

(On request of Mr. HORTON, and by unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. HORTON. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee referred to the map to the immediate right of the gentleman in the well. I am not familiar with it, but I assume it is a map of Cambodia. There are certain MRS with different numbers. I do not know whether those are military targets or what they are. But do I correctly understand that the gentleman's amendment would not permit the introduction of ground troops under any circumstances to go into the heart of or into the major portion of Cambodia?

Mr. FINDLEY. The only circumstance in which ground troops could be introduced into Cambodia would be in the event that the President should determine that such is required in order to protect the lives of American forces within South Vietnam.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. I wonder what would occur if the success of the Cambodia forces and our forces and of those allied to us should unexpectedly cause the other side to retreat toward, say, Phnom Penh? Would we then be obliged, under the interpretation the gentleman is giving the amendment, to pursue the enemy through the rest of Cambodia in order to be certain that at some future time they would not come back to the areas where they could harass our troops in South Vietnam?

Mr. FINDLEY. That is a question to which I do not think the answer would appear at this moment. It is up to the President as Commander in Chief to

make his interpretation of the implied powers that he exercises as Commander in Chief.

I wish to add one other thing before I yield further. This amendment to me is very important, because it speaks to the role of Congress in dealing with fundamental policy. It illustrates the limitations on our role in this area. But it also shows our authority, our responsibility. You will note that my amendment does express affirmatively the right of Congress to consent prior to the use of combat troops. If that is our decision, then we can affirmatively make the decision that our troops should be used. But it also requires that if the President makes a determination to use troops under the implied powers, then he must report promptly to the Congress that he has made that determination. That reporting requirement is nowhere spelled out in present law, to my knowledge. I think it is high time that we impose that reporting requirement on the President. I think this alone will have a salutary effect and will tend to discourage any unjust use.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I promised to yield to the gentleman from Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. JACOBS. I wonder if the gentleman would state whether or not it would be correct to say that the operative language of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution—and the amendment is set opposite the language in that resolution—was not contingent upon the protection of U.S. personnel in Vietnam and if, at the time the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was adopted, it was not also hoped a very strict construction of that resolution might be made by the President of the United States?

Mr. FINDLEY. I gather the drift of the gentleman's comments, and I must say the President may very broadly construe his implied powers. What we do or fail to do here cannot diminish his responsibility. He may fail to exercise it, but we cannot diminish his responsibility.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman did not respond. My question was: Was not the operative part of that language contingent on the protection and safety of troops?

Mr. FINDLEY. It had two operative parts and one had to deal with the attack on our ships, and the other dealt with the process through which our Government should go to counter an attack in Southeast Asia.

Mr. JACOBS. It was dealing with the safety of American personnel in Vietnam, as I recall.

Mr. FINDLEY. I believe only section 1 dealt with the safety of American personnel.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CEDERBERG. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as I spoke in opposition to the Reid of New York amendment because I felt very strongly about that, I do believe the amendment of the gentleman from Illinois is a real improvement, and

I see no real reason to oppose that amendment.

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, as I understand the amendment of the gentleman and his explanation, it seems to me he is inferring by what he said that the President now has delegated authority to act on his own to introduce American military personnel in Cambodia.

Mr. FINDLEY. He has an implied responsibility to do so in Cambodia to protect American lives in South Vietnam.

Mr. RIEGLE. Where specifically in the Constitution can the gentleman find that? I question that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

(On request of Mr. GROSS, and by unanimous consent, Mr. FINDLEY was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, in the event the gentleman's substitute should be defeated, I wonder if the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID) would accept an amendment to his amendment to provide that in perpetuity no American combat troops be sent anywhere in the world, including the Middle East?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, during the full decade of the sixties, I had the opportunity to sit down with several Presidents, and it was my privilege, following such conferences, to support the President, whether he was from my party or another party, in what he thought was in the best interests of the United States.

I am proud of the fact that in this country we can have that kind of cooperation between the leaders on one side of the aisle with a President coming from the other side of the aisle. I have always been very proud of the fact that in this body the Democratic leadership has responded as strongly in support of a Republican President as most of us responded and supported a Democratic President.

I happen to think this is a very crucial hour—and I use that word not literally, but figuratively—and it is my strong hope that at this particular point we, not as Democrats or Republicans, make a basic decision in the overall interest of the country.

I personally do not believe that either the Reid amendment or the Findley amendment ought to be approved here this afternoon. I do not know precisely what the President of the United States is going to say tonight. I think it is awfully important that the impact of his remarks not be hampered or hindered by some action taken here this afternoon.

I am a strong believer in the right of the legislative branch to participate in decisions involving our national security. But the problem of time right now is extremely serious. We could very easily take some action here this afternoon which might adversely affect the full beneficial impact of what the President will say tonight.

If I had my choice I would be opposed, as a consequence, to either amendment.

I have looked over the Findley amendment. I have consulted with experts in the executive branch of the Government. The choice between the Findley amendment and the Reid of New York amendment is easy.

The Findley amendment in effect says what the President has promised he will do. He has said that before introducing American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia he will seek the prior consent of the Congress of the United States.

On the other hand, he has said that if emergency situations arise where it is incumbent upon him as Commander in Chief to take action to protect the lives of American soldiers, sailors or marines, then he will act, but he will report immediately to the Congress and to the American people his reasons for taking such action under emergency circumstances.

Therefore, it seems to me that this proposed amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) does no harm, because it coincides with what the President has promised us and the American people; and therefore I intend to vote for the substitute, and I would ask all on our side of the aisle and as many as possible on the other side of the aisle to do the same.

It seems to me that this is the best course in a situation which could be complicating and harmful. The facts of life are that since 1965 the Vietnamese and the Vietcong have occupied sanctuaries just across the border from which they have made forays into South Vietnam, and after they have made those forays—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

(On request of Mr. PELLY, and by unanimous consent, Mr. GERALD R. FORD was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, after the enemy has made these excursions into South Vietnam, killing Americans and killing our allies, they have escaped back across the border and they have rested and recouped and regrouped, and they have rearmed. Then they would come back on another occasion, at their option, with the full protection of the former Government of Cambodia.

In order to save American lives the President has authorized the kind of action, in conjunction with the forces of our allies, which he will describe in detail to the Nation in a few hours.

I hope and trust that we take no action here today or tomorrow or next week that will undermine this long overdue effort to protect the lives of Ameri-

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ears now being killed in South Vietnam.

I am told that the statement to be made by the President tonight is considered to be one of major importance. I believe the best answer for us here this afternoon is to accept an amendment which I am assured coincides with the commitments already made by the President. I believe it is a far preferable amendment to the one offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID).

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. I believe that words about saving American lives confuse the issue. I believe that is what we are all trying to do, to save American lives. If Congress had acted many years ago, perhaps we could have saved many of the 40,000 American lives that have been lost in Vietnam.

Is it not true that the Findley amendment merely pulls the few teeth that the Reid amendment has in it and allows the President to do basically as he pleases?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I do not think it pulls the teeth of the Reid amendment. What the Findley amendment does is tell us that the President will consult with us in advance if he takes such a step in Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand, which is a promise that he has already made to us and to the American people. Then he is also given the flexibility to act if there is an emergency that arises to protect American lives and then report promptly thereafter. I think that is constructive and not harmful.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. REID of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I merely ask him, in the light of our earlier conversation this morning whether in deference to the President's speech tonight he would be willing to recommend that the House rise so that we can vote after the President's speech.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. GERALD R. FORD was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I know that there can be an argument made that we should defer, but I do not have the privilege nor the prerogative of making that decision. Therefore I do not feel that I should comment one way or another on a decision that was made earlier to conclude the business of the day.

Mr. REID of New York. If the gentleman will yield further very briefly?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. REID of New York. In deference to the point that the gentleman was making, is it not accurate that I said an effort should be made to have a vote after the President's speech so that we would not preclude whatever he might say but equally protect the right of the House to vote on a matter wherein we have constitutional responsibilities?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I simply say an argument can be made—

Mr. REID of New York. I was simply asking whether the suggestion was not made earlier by this gentleman.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. The gentleman from New York did make that suggestion. Right. It seems to me that in this circumstance we are faced with today the wise action, the constructive action, the action that is in the best interests of the United States would dictate that we support the Findley substitute and get on with the business of approving this legislation.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I would like to have the gentleman's opinion as to whether the Reid amendment or the substitute offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) would impact in any way the President's authority to have advisers in Thailand at this time, and, in the judgment of the gentleman, would it withdraw the advisers we now have operating in Thailand.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. In listening to an earlier colloquy between the gentleman from New York and the gentleman from Wisconsin I was led to believe that the Reid amendment would preclude the utilization of military advisers in Cambodia. Subsequently there was another colloquy that I am not sure clarified it, but there were more words concerning it.

Mr. REID of New York. It does not preclude that, I would say to the gentleman.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am glad to have that observation.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

SILENT EPIDEMIC

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BARRETT was allowed to speak out of order and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, on Monday, April 27, 1970, I introduced two bills, H.R. 17234 and H.R. 17260, designed to attack and eradicate, what has been labeled the "silent epidemic," afflicting an estimated half million infants and children in our Nation's cities and towns. An epidemic of poisonings resulting from the use of lead-based paints in the interior of houses. The effects of such poisonings are at times fatal and, when not fatal, far too often tragic—leaving children with mental retardation, blindness and chronic kidney disease among other consequences.

Lead-based paint has not been used on interiors for over 10 years, but in old buildings it lies just beneath the surface of newer coats of lead-free paint. When the old walls are not properly maintained, the old paint lifts away in layered chips along with the new. This is the decor of older housing, particularly of slum housing. The children living in deteriorating houses, whose walls are layered with sweet-tasting flakes of paint, are the victims. This condition is a major health problem for the infants of those families living in older housing. In fact, aside from infectious diseases this is the major infant health problem.

Compared to the major health problems which we have already solved, the solution to this problem is relatively simple. It can be solved on a local level. Unfortunately, however, our local governments are not able to cope with this matter on their own. Many local governments have enacted ordinances against the use of lead-based paint on housing interiors. However, enforcement of the ordinance proves difficult. Further, the lead-based paint all too often has been covered over. In addition, there is the problem of lack of knowledge by many parents as to the causes and early signs of lead poisoning.

This situation can and must be corrected; and, it must be corrected now. The two bills I introduced are designed to provide a two-pronged coordinated attack to remedy the situation.

The bill, H.R. 17234, concerns itself with the people who live in these homes. It would authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to make grants to assist local governments in developing and carrying out local programs to detect and treat incident of lead-based paint poisoning. In addition, it would assist in developing and carrying out programs that identify those areas that present a high risk to the health of the residents because of the presence of lead-based paints on interior surfaces, and then to develop and carry out programs to eliminate the hazards of lead-based paint poisoning.

The other bill, H.R. 17260, is concerned with the housing itself. It would authorize the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to make grants to units of local government to assist in developing and carrying out local lead-based paint elimination programs. The bill would require that there be an approved workable program for community improvement for the locality, containing a program to eliminate lead-based paint. In addition, the bill would amend other HUD assistance programs to require that they include an effective plan for eliminating the causes of lead-based paint poisoning.

Mr. Chairman, both of these programs are vitally important to the solution of this major health problem and a coordinated attack is needed. Therefore, I believe it is important to note that both of these bills contain a section requiring the Secretaries of the respective departments to "cooperate with and seek the advice of the heads of other departments or agencies regarding any programs under their respective responsibilities which are related to, or would be affected by, such authority" under the acts.

Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the Housing Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee, to which H.R. 17260 has been referred, I will make every effort for favorable consideration by that committee. I will also endeavor to have H.R. 17234, which was referred to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, receive favorable action.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to join with me in sponsoring and supporting legislation to attack the problem of lead-based paint poisoning.

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given

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permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Chairman, the Members of the House and the Senate and the American people were informed late yesterday of President Nixon's decision to provide American military advisers and American air support to the attacking South Vietnamese Army now in Cambodia. This decision was reached with the "advice and consent" of the President and his advisers and provides just cause for profound dismay.

The reasons cited for the action are similar to those given in support of the 1965 decision to widen the war in Vietnam—that widening of the conflict would bring a speedier end to the fighting. After 5 years of continued bloody fighting, 40,000 American lives, \$100 billion, the war in Vietnam continues unabated.

The faultiness of our earlier reasoning is then obvious. Yet, American decision-makers in the executive branch are still working under the same assumptions and appear ready to make the same mistakes again. The opening of this new front in Cambodia is in direct contradiction to American experience and to the recently issued "Guam doctrine."

I am deeply distressed at both the content of the decision and the manner in which it was reached. There is a constitutional requirement that the responsibility to commit American forces and arms abroad rests with two branches of Government—with the executive and the legislative branches concurrently. The President, whose search for a strict constructionist for the Supreme Court is well known, seems unwilling to follow the letter of the Constitution on this issue.

Instead, the Congress has, except for incomplete briefings, been bypassed. After being consulted "after the fact," it has been asked to concur in the decision because of responsibility to our fighting men.

The logic of such ex post facto reasoning escapes me. Decisions of such magnitude and potential consequence as troops to Cambodia require that approval be given by all representatives of the American people.

American policy seems directionless at this point. Vietnamization of the Vietnamese war and widening American involvement in Cambodia are contradictory. If the conflict expands into a pan-Indo-Chinese effort, American lives will be needlessly sacrificed.

We cannot continue to make up rules as we go along—or to spout outdated slogans. Is it too late to ask President Nixon to reconsider his decision? It is certainly not too late to ask Congress to express its disapproval. Congress has the moral and constitutional responsibility to act.

I support the amendment of the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID).

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STRATTON. Would it be in order to move at this time that the Reid of

New York amendment and all amendments thereto be tabled so that this matter of grave consequence might be considered at another time?

The CHAIRMAN. A motion to table is not in order at this time.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT TO THE SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. FINDLEY FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. REID OF NEW YORK

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT to the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. FINDLEY for the amendment offered by Mr. REID of New York:

After the word "Congress" strike out the proviso exception.

[Mr. LEGGETT addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. OBEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois, (Mr. FINDLEY) but in my judgment that amounts to little more than a Gulf of Tonkin resolution for Cambodia.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment of the gentleman from California to prohibit the use of any funds under this bill to introduce American troops into Cambodia.

Mr. Chairman, I have most certainly not harassed any President—Mr. Johnson or Mr. Nixon—on the conduct of the war in Vietnam. I have expressed doubts about President Johnson's policy since 1965, but I did not ask for, nor did I support immediate unilateral withdrawal.

When in October Senator Scott, the Republican minority leader, asked for a 60-day moratorium on criticism of the President's policies in Vietnam, I supported that.

When debate on Vietnam threatened to become highly partisan in late October, I gave speeches to my own party units asking them to give the President more time. When the Wright resolution came before the House, I voted for it because of my reluctance to restrain the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. At that time, however, I pointed out that my support for the resolution should not be interpreted as a blanket endorsement of every facet of the President's November 3 speech, nor as a pledge of unqualified support for any future Presidential action as yet unknown and undefined.

It is difficult for me to support this amendment because I do not like to in any way restrict the action of the President. But Mr. Chairman, the issue today is broader than the freedom of movement of one man, and that issue is twofold. It is first a question of whether this Nation is willing to risk a widening of the war by involvement of American troops in another unhappy nation in Indochina, and it is second, a question

of the responsibility of the Congress in determining the policies the country will follow.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we should vote on this bill, or on this question, until after the President's speech tonight. If we had any sense, we would postpone our action until at least tomorrow, and possibly later. But, in the absence of any delay in the consideration of this subject, I believe we have no alternative but to support the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, since the late 1950's we have been involved in Vietnam without specific congressional declarations of support. Since 1964 we have required young men to fight in combat in that unhappy land without specific congressional approval except for the Tonkin resolution, which is, at best, of dubious clarity. We are now faced with the question of whether in the absence of specific congressional consideration of this new question we should send our young men into another area of war.

We have been told by the President "no more Vietnams." Mr. Speaker, if we continue to send troops into Cambodia we run the high risk of having at least one more Vietnam and that is two more than we can afford. Indeed, it may already be too late to avoid it. Mr. Speaker, we cannot in conscience and we should not, out of respect for the Congress as an institution, allow involvement in Cambodia without specific congressional approval of that added involvement. We have had men die in an undeclared war in Vietnam for 9 years. We should not support actions which would lead to the killing of Americans in another undeclared war. In the absence of congressional consideration of this added involvement, and in the absence of congressional determination that this added involvement is in the best interest of the United States, I cannot vote to financially support such efforts. I am tired of young Americans dying in "unofficial" wars.

I am opposed to sending American men into new areas of warfare without a statement from the Congress that their sacrifice is both necessary and wise.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, the recent unilateral Presidential decision to send American combat advisers, tactical air support, medical evacuation teams, and other support to Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia indicates that there is a total disregard for the advice and consent role of the Congress in making foreign policy decisions that affect our economy and the lives of our citizens.

The prior consent of Congress should, in all instances, be obtained before any decision of such potential military magnitude is made. Surely the lessons of Korea and Vietnam must not be repeated over and over again before the Congress is allowed to have a voice in determining whether or not expanded American involvement in Southeast Asian nations is in the best interests of the United States.

No doubt the safety of American troops in Vietnam must be a serious consideration in determining our Southeast Asian policy. However, the additional implications of such vital action should be approved by debate in the Congress before America is involved and committed in any other nation. This is the

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only way rational foreign policy can be established.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in emphatic support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID), which says:

In line with the expressed intent of the President of the United States, no part of the funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos, Thailand and Cambodia.

This House, by sustaining this amendment, will make it clear to the President and more importantly to the people of the United States and the world, that we will no longer support America military excesses in Southeast Asia. Rather than sending our boys into Cambodia, we should be loading them on troopships and bringing them home. And it is at home, in the United States, where we should be concentrating our efforts and our money.

Have the mothers, wives, families, and soldiers of this Nation not suffered enough? Why must we perpetuate our existence in Southeast Asia, when it has been demonstrated time and time again that the people of this Nation want no more Vietnams.

President Nixon entered office on the strength of three promises; to end the war, to cool the economy, and generally to lower the voices of discontent and wrangling in our country.

Not only has he failed to do any one of these things. He took new steps yesterday to generate new, and who knows how far reaching, antagonisms when he ordered Americans into Cambodia. American blood has stained the earth of Vietnam. I will not see that same blood wasted on the soil of Cambodia.

I for one will not waffle on this latest Nixon folly. No money for a war in Cambodia. No American lives lost in a war in Cambodia. To this I pledge myself. And I hope that my colleagues will do similarly by voting for the Reid amendment.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, while I support the military procurement authorization bill providing for about \$20 billion for military procurement for the next year, I hope we will be able to scale the expenditure level back in the appropriation bill that will come later. In any event, the authorization bill for 1971, on which we are voting, is \$400 million less than the authorization for last year. It includes funds for the Safeguard system that I believe is sound as a wholly defensive and deterrent weapon. Its development may well have been helpful in the progress to date at the SALT talks.

I believe that that weapon system, as well as the other military procurements authorized by the bill, are necessary in today's world when the Russians continue their buildup in strategic missiles and their activities in support of troublemakers such as the Arab nations.

While I voted on a number of amendments today, no final vote occurred on the bill, and final action was deferred until Wednesday, May 6. The deferment occurred to permit the Congress to study the President's message on Cambodia before acting on an amendment proposed by Congressman Ramm of New York, and an amendment to that amendment pro-

posed by Congressman FINDLEY of Illinois. The Reid amendment would have prohibited the use of the funds being authorized for the purpose of introduction of American ground troops into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia. The Findley amendment to the Reid amendment added an exception to permit such use to the extent required to protect the lives of American troops still remaining in South Vietnam. It also would have required a report by the President to the Congress on any such finding.

My own feeling is that no American ground troops should be introduced into Laos, Thailand, or Cambodia and certainly it should not be done without the expressed authorization of Congress. However, the Findley amendment seemed to me to be consistent with inherent powers of the President, as to the defense of our forces and I, therefore, would have supported both the Reid amendment as amended by the Findley amendment.

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Chairman, there is no question in my mind that President Nixon has neither the moral nor legal right to commit American military forces in Cambodia without the consent of Congress.

The administration has now embarked on widening the war in Southeast Asia which will further delay the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. President Nixon persists in the tragic illusion that military action rather than political settlement is the answer to the Indochina turmoil of the last 16 years. As I have said before on the floor of this House, the President's policy is simply the persistence of national pride beyond any political, economic, or moral justification. It is a policy that has cost the lives of almost 50,000 American young men. We must not let it continue. Let our policy be committed to saving lives rather than saving face.

By ordering American military action in Cambodia this week, President Nixon has shown contempt for the overwhelming desire of the American people to get our troops out of Southeast Asia. The President was elected to terminate our involvement, not complicate and deepen it. The democratic process is gravely threatened when any President intentionally ignores such a mandate.

I will urge my constituents to make known their opposition to the President's Cambodian decision. It is their sons and their dollars that he uses without their consent or the consent of Congress.

The American people know a tragic mistake has been made in Vietnam. It remains only for the Nixon administration to accept once and for all that judgment. So let the Government be reminded who is master and who is servant.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, the House deliberation today on the question of introducing U.S. ground combat troops in Cambodia has taken us a giant step toward restoring the role of the Congress in foreign policy.

I am opposed to the introduction of U.S. combat troops into Cambodia. I view the presence of American advisers and medical personnel with the South Vietnamese attack force invading Cam-

bodia as extremely dangerous. To me, the Nixon doctrine clearly precludes sending in American troops, leaving open the question of tactical air support and logistical support.

The memory, that advisers were only the forerunners of combat troops in the quagmire of Vietnam, is all too fresh. While the motions before the House would preclude only combat forces, I believe the Congress in the exercise of its responsibilities should be informed and its consent sought before even advisers are dispatched into foreign war zones.

In all of this, Mr. Chairman, our attention continues to be diverted from other troubled areas of the world. In my opinion, the danger of confrontation with the Soviet Union and of full-scale war is in the Mediterranean. While we have concentrated on Vietnam, the Soviet Union has placed a major fleet in the Mediterranean and has developed bases in Egypt. There is evidence that the Middle East fighting is entering a new and dangerous phase with Egyptian troops, armed with the latest Russian equipment and backed by Russian technicians, carrying out a major offensive. New SAM missile systems have been deployed in Egypt, manned by Russian technicians. Today there are persistent reports of Soviet pilots flying Egyptian jets over Egypt.

This is a very trying time for U.S. policymakers. But it seems clear to me that the interest of the United States in working toward a lessening of tension will not be served by our involvement in Cambodia. Our energies, on the other hand, should be directed toward a political settlement in Indochina and our attention directed to dangers of enlarged conflagration in the Middle East.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, the extension of the Vietnam war into Cambodia is most regrettable. This is especially so since the undefined, open-ended policy of Vietnamization appears to include a willingness to follow the South Vietnamese on a course of military adventurism.

One wonders, with great concern, if, as we followed South Vietnam into Cambodia, we would also follow South Vietnam on an invasion of the north, something that has been advocated by Vice President Ky.

Mr. FARBSTEN. Mr. Chairman, the President in expanding the war in Vietnam into an Indochina war is pursuing an illusionary dream. We have heard the "we can win the war if only we expand it" logic before, and each time it has turned out to have cruel and predictable consequences. The Pentagon told us in 1965 if only we committed American forces to Vietnam we could drive Ho Chi Minh out. When that did not succeed, we were told, if only we bombed the northern ports, it would destroy the spirit of the North Vietnamese and bring military victory.

When we sent massive numbers of young Americans to Vietnam, it did not deter Ho Chi Minh, and when we began massive bombing of the north, it did not break the spirit of the enemy.

Now the President has decided to accept the advice of the military who say

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25X1

9. [] Called Martha Klueber, in the office of Senator John Sherman Cooper, and explained to her that we would be glad to provide an oral briefing in response to the questions contained in the Senator's letter of 24 April. I said Mr. Bruce Clarke could do the briefing and because of sensitive matters involved we would want to limit it to the Senator alone, with no staff personnel.

Miss Klueber called back shortly and we agreed to 3:30 p.m. Thursday, 30 April for the briefing.

25X1

10. [] Representative Paul N. McCloskey (R., Calif.) called to request a briefing on the current situation in Cambodia tomorrow morning. I said I thought we could arrange an intelligence briefing but of course would not be in a position to discuss any U.S. involvement or possible course of action. McCloskey said he fully understood this and wondered if the briefing could be arranged for 0800.

After checking with the Director and Mr. George Carver, I called McCloskey back and confirmed that Mr. Carver would brief him at Headquarters at 0800 tomorrow.

25X1A

11. [] Accompanied [] of OSR, to a briefing of Jim Kendall, Chief Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness Investigation, on the Soviet swing wing bomber. Kendall was primarily interested in checking on a statement made by Senator Dominick, which he said was made on the basis of information given him at the Agency, to the effect that []

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12. [] Talked with Miss Mary Louise O'Malley, in the office of Senator Ralph Smith (R., Ill.), about the Senator's letter to the Director concerning the case of [] I advised Miss O'Malley that []

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[] Mrs. O'Malley thanked me for this information and said she would close out the file on the Agency letter without the necessity of a written response. She mentioned that they had not yet received a response to their letter to the CSC.

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- 25X1 8. [] Mr. James G. Lowenstein and Mr. Richard M. Moose, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, visited Headquarters for a briefing on Cambodia which was presented by Mr. R. Jack Smith and Mr. [] In departing, Mr. Lowenstein and Mr. Moose noted their appreciation for the briefing and the coverage given the topic by Mr. Smith and Mr. [] Later in the day I picked up from Mr. Lowenstein a copy of the official itinerary for their travel to Cambodia.
- 25X1A
- 25X1A
- 25X1 9. [] I delivered General Cushman's letter concerning [] to Representative Lawrence G. Williams (R., Pa.). I also met with his Administrative Assistant, Mr. Robert Siegrist. They appreciated the Agency's assistance in this matter and indicated that a firm position has apparently been located for [] Representative Williams noted during our brief conversation that he has the highest regard for the Agency and from his information feels that we are doing a good job.
- 25X1A
- 25X1 10. [] Met with Mr. Ralph Preston, House Appropriations Committee staff, who advised that he had shown the Director's reserve withdrawal letter to Chairman Mahon and Representative Minshall. He related that they both appeared to take the letter in stride.
- 25X1C I briefed Mr. Preston on the ChiCom satellite; the multiple Soviet satellite launch; the Soviet SS-NX-5 test failure; SS-11 tests; French missile testing; [] Russian fighter squadron operations; current items on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and Soviet increase in industrial production. With regard to the ChiCom satellite, Mr. Preston noted that a question was asked this morning during [] briefing and he thought Mr. [] had indicated []
- 25X1A 25X1A
- 25X1A 25X1A
- 25X1 11. [] Met with Miss Oneta Stockstill, House Armed Services Committee staff, and confirmed with her the administrative arrangements for the Director's meeting with the Committee tomorrow, 28 April, at 2:00 p.m. in room 2212 Rayburn House Office Building.

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CAMBODIA.

Washington, D. C., Monday, April 27, 1970

Fulbright Prepares

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is preparing the groundwork for yet another confrontation with the White House over American involvement in Southeast Asia. It could become a major challenge to President Nixon's conduct of foreign policy.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers was appearing before the committee this afternoon, apparently to testify, among other things, on the U.S.-approved dispatch of automatic weapons to Cambodia from South Vietnam last week. The administration has discounted the importance of this military aid to the besieged government of Cambodia, and assured members of the committee that the weapons were captured AK47s of Chinese manufacture, and not American arms.

On Wednesday two committee staff members, James G.

Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, are scheduled to leave for a two-week inspection tour of Cambodia to report on the extent of the American presence there.

Lowenstein and Moose caused some displeasure within the administration after a similar trip to Vietnam last December.

Their published report called into question the President's public optimism concerning large-scale troop reductions. It said most officials of the American and South Vietnamese governments in Saigon were presuming that 250,000 troops would remain in the country "for years."

There is an important difference in the committee's quick action to make an independent judgment on conditions in Cambodia, where Prime Minister Lon Nol's government has asked for massive U.S. aid.

In the cases of Vietnam and

Laos, Chairman J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., and the leading members of the committee found themselves reacting to policy after it was firmly established, and unable to convince either the administration or the senate to cancel U.S. military commitments.

Through a series of recent actions the committee has prepared itself to muster widespread support in Congress to block any attempt by the President to extend military aid to Cambodia, or any country, without congressional approval.

One of these was the successful passage in the last session of a National Commitments Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that "a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the legislative and executive branches...."

Another was the establishment of a new subcommittee

Challenge to Nixon Asia Policy

under Stuart Symington, D-Mo., to investigate the extent of American commitments around the world.

It has completed hearings on the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Laos, and last week succeeded, after months of struggle with the administration, in publishing 90 percent of the secret testimony taken on Laos.

The debate and study has spread disenchantment with the past conduct of the Vietnam war among congressmen, and led to the passage of a defense appropriations bill amendment forbidding the financing of American troops in Laos or Thailand.

This reassertion of legislative prerogative is expected to have some effect on the President's actions in Cambodia. But committee sources believe the recently published Laos transcript may have the greatest influence on how Nixon

The testimony showed in detail how a small American commitment multiplied, while successive administrations followed a deliberate policy of denying American military involvement.

Committee sources, by use of newspaper clippings and similar dispatches, make a telling case that the only group deceived was the American public.

The report tells of secret American actions to continue military activities after the signing of the Geneva Accords of 1962. The Soviet Union tacitly approved the continuance, apparently to maintain an anti-Chinese balance in the area.

It also showed that after the cessation of bombing over much of North Vietnam in November 1968, U.S. B52 bombers kept raiding northern Laos, near the North Vietnamese border. Committee sources insist

that this must have had a marked impact on the unwillingness of the North Vietnamese to negotiate in Paris.

Excised from the report, but readily available through dispatches from journalists on the scene, was information on the use of the Agency for International Development mission in Laos as a cover for Central Intelligence Agency operatives, the use of Thailand as a base for bombing raids over Laos, and the introduction of third country nationals as ground troops in Laos, financed by the United States.

On release of the transcript, Fulbright said, "I have never seen a country engage in so many devious undertakings as this," and Symington charged that the ambassadors to Laos, first William H. Sullivan and now G. McMurtrie Godley, 20041001, into a "policy of concealment" by their role in directing the secret war, including the selection of targets for

American pilots to bomb.

When Sullivan was ambassador, Godley was assistant secretary of state for Southeast Asia. Last year they exchanged positions. "This is an indication of what a tight shop the secret warriors ran," said a committee source.

"Sullivan made himself quite a reputation as an 'activist' ambassador. You can be sure that Mac Godley is not going to be the first ambassador to preside over an American defeat in Laos," the source added.

The public facets of the Laos war were just beginning to unfold when Cambodia was added to the strategic balance in Southeast Asia by the overthrow of Norodom Sihanouk.

At least some high administration officials are reported to view the pro-American government and its request for aid as a golden opportunity to force the exhausted North Vietnamese to overextend their

lines.

The argument is that a trickle of aid to Cambodia now might shorten the Vietnam war by denying enemy troops their traditional Cambodian sanctuaries and staging areas.

Other officials are fearful of both the public consequences at home and the possibility of new entrapments in the battlefield should aid be extended.

This is the position that the Foreign Relations Committee's senior members lean toward.

When confronted with the details of the secret war in Laos, administration officials often note that leading members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and especially Symington, knew many of the details, but declined to oppose the situation until recently.

This underscores the fact that the possibility for a similar secret war in Cambodia is slight, and probably doesn't exist.

NIXON AIDES SPLIT ON CAMBODIA ISSUE

**Pressures Stiff as President
Seeks Decision Viewed as
Fateful for Indochina**

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 23 — President Nixon is struggling with a decision on further military aid to Cambodia in terms that at least some of his advisers portray as fateful.

Mr. Nixon appears to be under enormous but conflicting pressures from a variety of sources. For the moment he is described as still reluctant to send large quantities of American arms to the beleaguered Lon Nol Government of Premier Norodom Sihanouk. But both military and diplomatic developments in the near future will affect his decision.

There is general agreement in the Administration that the total collapse of the new Lon Nol Government would pose a sizable threat to allied operations in South Vietnam and have far-reaching implications for the security of the Indochina peninsula. But there is disagreement about the extent of the threat to the Government in Phnompenh and the capacity of the United States to help it survive.

Pressure on Soviet Hinted

The possibility of limited aid by other countries, notably Indonesia, is under urgent study.

There are also indications—without official acknowledgment—that the Soviet Union is being urged to restrain Communist forces in Cambodia lest their actions and American responses spoil whatever chance remains of a negotiated settlement for Southeast Asia.

Some senior military officials, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contend that the President now controls the fate of the new Cambodian Government and that the allies' military success in South Vietnam depends on its survival. They define the situation

are calling for sizable arms shipments not only to buttress the Cambodian Army but also to give more Cambodians confidence that the new leadership, which ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk, can survive.

With a friendly or even allied regime in Phnompenh, the military men argue, the allies will be able to harass or even to disperse the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces that have been using Cambodian territory as a base for attacks into South Vietnam. The collapse of the new government or the return of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, they maintain, would turn not only the frontier regions but all of Cambodia into a hostile base for Communist assaults on South Vietnam and Laos.

But other senior advisers, apparently including key officials of the State Department, are counseling caution on the White House. They are worried that an increased American involvement in Cambodia, no matter how direct or modest at the start, could provoke a still wider Indochina war as well as a loss of the popular support that Mr. Nixon has achieved with the promise of an end of American participation in the conflict.

Senators Ask Accounting

Meanwhile, influential Democrats in the Senate, already disturbed about the supply of captured Communist weapons to Cambodia in recent days, were demanding an accounting from the Administration and warning against a piecemeal involvement there.

When the New York Times reported this morning that the Administration had agreed to give Cambodia several thousand automatic rifles of Soviet design and Chinese Communist manufacture, Secretary of State William P. Rogers quickly assured Senate critics that it was a relatively minor development involving no breach of his promise to consult the legislators on new aid shipments.

Mr. Rogers telephoned Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to confirm the report and to discount its significance. Mr. Fulbright is said to have asked for the Secretary's detailed testimony on the situation, but Mr. Rogers held to his plan to meet with the committee in closed session next Monday.

The White House remained publicly noncommittal, as it usually is while the President weighs conflicting advice. He is meeting with the National Security Council, but the subject of the discussions was not dis-

Mr. Nixon's press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, confirmed the report about the shipment of captured weapons but disclaimed any primary American responsibility for the aid. The AK-47 rifles were being supplied by South Vietnam, he said, "with our knowledge and approval."

Mr. Ziegler refused to disclose the size of the shipment or the methods of delivery. He refused later to comment on a new report from Cambodia that American-made weapons had also reached Phnompenh.

The President's spokesman said the delivery did not represent "a response to the specific requests for arms"—by which he apparently means an urgent appeal from the Cambodian Premier in a letter Monday. Other sources said the delivery had in fact been a considered American response to earlier Cambodian appeals for help to provide at least an interim token of support.

One source raised the possibility that the captured weapons might actually be passing from American stocks in Okinawa, where seized Communist arms have been refurbished for use by special troops operating behind Communist lines in Vietnam.

Mr. Ziegler justified the arms aid to Cambodia with a severe denunciation of what he called the massive and overt Communist aggression there. He said several times that there "is no question as to who is the aggressor" and called the aggression clear violation of the 1954 Geneva accords on Indochina and "similar to be blatant violation of the 1962 accords in Laos."

The reported diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union are believed to be based on the new-evident pattern of North Vietnamese military activity throughout Indochina. The Nixon Administration is seeking further evidence of a Soviet interest in a new Geneva conference on all Southeast Asia—despite recent denials

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Guns Traced to Saigon

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that Moscow was promoting the idea.

In any case American officials are thought to be saying to the Russians—and through them to the North Vietnamese—that the conversion of Cambodia into a Communist-run state or base of operations would be viewed here as a major new threat to all of Southeast Asia.

American willingness in recent years to let the North Vietnamese use Cambodian soil as a sanctuary from battle in Vietnam has been cited to the Russians as evidence of Washington's desire to contain the war. The hope that Cambodia might yet be recognized as neutral and nonbelligerent by both sides has also caused the White House to limit allied military forays into sanctuary areas in the four weeks since General Lon Nol came to power.

The dilemma confronting the President is defined as great in many quarters and as grave in some.

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Military commanders here and in South Vietnam believe that they could turn the tide of battle decisively if allowed to attack the 40,000 Communist troops in Cambodia. To achieve that, they favor an urgent aid program to prop up Premier Lon Nol's government and the

dispatch of some military advisers—Americans if possible but non-Americans if necessary—to tutor the generally weak and undersupplied Cambodian Army of about 30,000 men.

The military men tend to put the most pessimistic possible interpretation on intelligence reports from Phnompenh. They see the Cambodian capital imperiled, believe the road and rail lines to the port of Sihanoukville are cut off and the river traffic on the Mekong severely curtailed.

However, other sources have told Mr. Nixon that there is no imminent threat to Phnompenh and that the intentions of Communist-led forces in different parts of Cambodia are not entirely clear.

Preferring to accept the less urgent view, Mr. Nixon is said to feel that he still has time to await both military and diplomatic moves by the Communist forces and Governments. He is also awaiting signs of what Indonesia, France and other interested countries decide to do to support Phnompenh.

Though tempted by the short-term military advantages that might result from an all-out attack on the Communists in Cambodia, the President is

described as convinced that such an attack would finally kill whatever chances remain of negotiating a settlement for Indochina, or at least parts of it.

He also described as mindful of the political opposition that would develop in the United States to a wider war effort.

Mr. Nixon's reluctance to become further involved was portrayed not only by usually reliable sources in the Administration but also by a vigorous opponent of any military aid to the Cambodian regime, Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader.

While Senator Fulbright described the transfer of captured weapons to Cambodia as "very dangerous" and Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine called it "disturbing," Senator Mansfield said only that he was not prepared to regard the shipment as "a first step" toward deeper involvement, though it perhaps "contains the elements" of such a step. He said he knew the President to be extremely worried about developments in Cambodia, to be moving "slowly and carefully" in response, more by "examining" the situation than "considering" any immediate decision.

Mr. Mansfield had declared himself opposed to military aid to Cambodia "in any way, shape or form." He has regretted the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, whom he believed to be a deft and neutral politician able to keep his country out of the Indochina war.

To obtain an independent

source of information for the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee announced that two of its staff consultants would fly to Cambodia next week. They are James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, who recently brought back a critical examination of the pacification program in South Vietnam.

CIA Reported Coordinating Cambodia Military Attack

SAIGON (AP)—Informed sources said today two Americans believed to be from the Central Intelligence Agency flew into the Cambodian provincial capital of Svay Rieng last week apparently to coordinate military operations against enemy forces.

They reported two South Vietnamese helicopters flew the Americans into Svay Rieng, 25 miles west of the South Vietnamese border.

The informants gave this account:

When the helicopters landed the two Americans were met by Cambodian officials carrying maps in their hands. The Cambodian officials pointed out to the Americans the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong positions inside Svay Rieng Province.

Shortly after the meeting, South Vietnamese fighter-bombers began attacking suspected North Vietnamese base camps and troop positions along a 30-mile stretch on both sides of the border. Their effort was aimed at softening up the enemy positions for a division-sized infantry assault that was to follow.

At daybreak Monday, as many as 5,000 South Vietnamese troops and hundreds of armored

personnel carriers began a drive across a 30-mile line stretching from the South Vietnamese district town of Tuyen Binh, 55 miles west of Saigon, to the district town of Tuyen Binh, 55 miles west of Saigon, to the district town of Hong Ngu, 75 miles west of the capital.

Sources said that in the first two days of the operation, South Vietnamese forces have killed 221 enemy troops, seized nearly 1,000 new weapons from base camps, and destroyed 90 huts apparently used as storage areas. Field reports said South

Vietnamese forces suffered 21 troops killed and 101 wounded.

Efforts to reach CIA officials in Saigon for comment were fruitless. There was no answer at the agency's phone.

Sources have said the South Vietnamese and Cambodian local officials are collaborating in efforts to crush up to 20,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in base camps in southeastern Cambodia.

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Cambodia-Cia 360

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Sources have said the South Vietnamese and Cambodians local officials are collaborating in armed efforts to crush up to 20,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in base camps in southeastern Cambodia.

There have been three major offensive thrusts into Cambodia in the past 10 days, and in one of them last week a token force of Cambodian troops fought with the South Vietnamese. The Cambodians were supplied ammunition, food and water by the South Vietnamese, witnesses said.

At the time Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown as chief of state March 18, Communist and other reports said the CIA had a hand in the coup. But reporters in Saigon said they found no evidence of this.

JF909aes April 22

Press Item for the DCI

Date: 22 Apr

Item: No. 4

Ref: No.

Comment: Goodwin has copy

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